Exhibit B

Community Guidelines Enforcement Report

January 1, 2023 – March 31, 2023 Published June 30, 2023

About this report

TikTok is a global entertainment platform fueled by the creativity of our diverse community. We strive to foster a fun and inclusive environment where people can create, find community, and be entertained. To maintain that environment, we take action upon content and accounts that violate our Community Guidelines or Terms of Service and

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 3 of 35 regularly publish information about these actions to hold ourselves accountable to our community.

TikTok uses a combination of innovative technology and people to identify, review, and action content that violates our policies. This report provides quarterly insights into the volume and nature of content and accounts removed from our platform.

Analysis

TikTok's Community Guidelines are designed to foster an entertaining experience that prioritizes safety, inclusion, and authenticity. Our policies apply to everyone and all content, and we strive to be consistent and equitable in our enforcement. This analysis provides additional context to supplement the data in this report.

Safety

In this report, we're sharing new insights as we continue to bring transparency to how we operate and protect the platform. First, we're providing insight into the language capabilities of TikTok's moderators whose work not only contributes to a safer platform but also plays a vital role in enhancing our automated moderation systems. Second, we're providing data on our response time to remove violative content reported by our community using our in-app and online reporting tools.

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 4 of 35 During this report period, we updated TikTok's Community Guidelines.

These guidelines went into effect in April 2023 and will be reflected in our next report.

Security

We remain vigilant in our efforts to safeguard the platform from adversarial threats, including the presence of inauthentic or fake accounts and engagement. These threats persistently probe and attack our systems, leading to occasional fluctuations in the reported metrics within these areas. Despite this, we remain steadfast in our commitment to promptly identify and remove any accounts, content, or activities that seek to artificially boost popularity on our platform.

Protecting our community is our priority. While TikTok is a global platform, we take a localized approach to regulatory compliance, collaborating with stakeholders to gain a deep understanding of local concerns and fulfill our regulatory commitments. In the U.S., we have established a dedicated division called TikTok U.S. Data Security (USDS) to strengthen our data protection policies and protocols, further protect our users, and build confidence in our systems, governance, and controls in the U.S. Furthermore, we introduced Project Clover, an initiative to create a specially-designed protective environment for European TikTok user data. With Project Clover, we are designing and implementing a range of new measures to reinforce existing data protections, add new ones, and align our overall approach to data governance with the principle of European data

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 5 of 35 sovereignty.


As we navigate an ever-evolving threat landscape, TikTok remains dedicated to preserving the integrity of our community and strengthening our defenses against adversarial threats. We are committed to upholding the trust placed in us by our users and will continue to invest in robust measures that prioritize user safety, data protection, and regulatory compliance.

Ads

TikTok has strict policies to protect users from fake, fraudulent, or misleading content, including ads. Advertiser accounts and ad content are held to these policies and must follow our Community Guidelines, Advertising Guidelines, and Terms of Service. During the first quarter of 2023, both the total volume of ads removed for violating our advertising policies and the volume of ads removed due to account-level actions decreased. We understand that ensuring the safety of advertisers and users requires ongoing dedication. As such, we are committed to consistently reviewing and further strengthening our systems to swiftly and accurately remove ads that breach our policies. By upholding strict policies, leveraging advanced detection mechanisms, and continuously improving our systems, we strive to foster an advertising experience that is trustworthy, enjoyable, and aligned with the values of our vibrant TikTok community.




Total videos removed/total videos, by quarter



NOTE: Total videos removed represent about 1% of all videos uploaded to TikTok. Video removal volumes referenced in this report include short-form video content (including image-based videos and stories).


Total videos removed/restored, by type and

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 8 of 35 **quarter**




NOTE: Restored videos are reflected in both the removal volumes and restore volumes in the above chart.

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 9 of 35 **Removal rate, by quarter/policy**



NOTE: Proactive removal means identifying and removing a video before it's reported. Removal within 24 hours means removing the video within 24 hours of it being posted on our platform.

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 10 of 35 **Total video removal, by policy**




NOTE: This chart shows the volume of videos removed by policy violation. A video may violate multiple policies and each violation is reflected. In certain rare circumstances, such as emergency situations or hardware outages, we may not always capture the exact video violation category. These videos are not represented in the above

Total video removal and rates, by sub-policy




NOTE: Only videos that have been reviewed and removed by

Removal volume and rates, by market



NOTE: This chart shows the fifty markets with the largest volumes of removed videos and represents approximately 90% of overall removal

Human moderation language distribution




NOTE: This chart accounts for the primary language of moderators working on short-form video, livestream, comments, accounts, and

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 14 of 35
TikTok Now. It does not account for moderators who may cover
multiple languages. Languages that represent less than 2% of all
moderators' primary languages have been aggregated in the "Other
languages" category. Moderation may also take place in additional
languages, even if they are not assigned as a primary language among
moderators.


Response time to community-reported content

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 15 of 35




NOTE: Only videos that have been both first reported by users and resulted in a removal action are included. Data reflects the difference between when TikTok received a user report and the time at which the content was removed. Balancing the input and output of human reviews requires matching capacity, training, and content, which occasionally may result in longer review times.

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 16 of 35 **Total account removal, by quarter and reason**



NOTE: In addition to removing accounts for our violating Community Guidelines, we remove accounts determined to be spam, along with spam videos posted by those accounts. We also take proactive measures to prevent spam accounts from being created through automated means.

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 17 of 35 Fake engagement




NOTE: We take action to both remove and prevent likes, followers, and follow requests when we deem the activity to come through automated or inauthentic mechanisms.



Our

commitments

Reports



NOTE: When we remove accounts for spam, we also remove videos created by those accounts under our spam policies.

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 19 of 35 **Covert influence operations**

Covert
influence
operations
networks
identified
and removed
in Q1 2023

Accounts in network Followers of network

that this
network
operated
from Russia
and targeted
primarily
Russian
audiences.
The network
was partially
created prior
to our
suspending
livestreaming
and new

content in Russia and extensively

We assess

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 20 of 35 Used location Internal 15 38,326 obfuscation

The

individuals

as a tactic.

behind this

network used

inauthentic

identities,

including

inauthentic

news outlets,

in order to

artificially

amplify a pro-

Russia

viewpoint

targeting

discourse

about the war

in Ukraine.

We assess

that this

network

operated

from Russia

and targeted

Russian

audiences.

The network

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 21 of 35 extensively used location obfuscation as a tactic to mislead TikTok's systems. The individuals behind this network used 254 34,110 Internal inauthentic accounts to hyper-post content in order to artificially promote Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin's war film "The Best in Hell", as well as to amplify pro-Russia viewpoints in the context of the war in Ukraine.

We assess

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 22 of 35 that this network operated from Poland and targeted Polish audiences. The individuals behind this network 40,256 Internal 41 created inauthentic identities and hyper-posted comments with similar content in order to artificially promote anti-Russian viewpoints. We assess that this

network

operated

from Israel

and targeted

Israeli

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 23 of 35 audiences.

The

individuals

behind this

network used

inauthentic

identities in

order to

artificially

Internal

362

168,202

amplify

specific pro-

Israeli

viewpoints

targeting

discourse

about the

ongoing

conflict in

Palestine in

the context of

the latest

Israeli

elections.

We assess

that this

network

operated

from Russia

and targeted

Moldovan

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 24 of 35 audiences. The individuals behind this network posed as inauthentic news Internal 55,066 11 agencies and created inauthentic identities in order to cultivate a follower base on TikTok and then redirect followers offplatform to circumvent the regional TikTok ban in Russia.

We assess

that this

network

operated

from Russia

and targeted

Russian

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 25 of 35 audiences. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts and hyper-posted content with the aim of Internal 1,351 226,838 artificially amplifying specific pro-Russia viewpoints in the context of the war in Ukraine, abusing the re-share function and using the web application in order to circumvent the regional TikTok ban in Russia.

We assess

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 26 of 35 that this network operated from the UK and Nigeria and targeted Nigerian audiences. The individuals behind this network used inauthentic identities and Internal 15 47,103 posed as inauthentic news outlets in order to artificially amplify viewpoints related to the Biafra region, targeting discourse about elections in Nigeria.

We assess that this

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 27 of 35 network operated from Russia and targeted various European countries such as Germany, Italy, and the UK. The individuals behind this network used 1,480 impersonatio Internal 12 n in order to artificially amplify specific viewpoints related to Ukraine's president Zelensky, the economic sanctions currently imposed on Russia, and Ukrainian refugees.

We assess

that this

network

operated

from Ireland

and targeted

Irish

audiences.

The

individuals

behind this

network

created

inauthentic

accounts;

hyper-posted

content with

divisive views

related to

nationalism in

Ireland,

Japan,

Russia, and

Taiwan; and

hyper-posted

comments

with similar

low-quality

content in an

attempt to

Internal 72 94,743

TikTok users off-platform and to intensify social conflict. We assess that this network operated from Malaysia and targeted Malay audiences. The individuals behind this network created 285,511 Internal 175 inauthentic accounts and hyper-posted identical comments in English and Malay on

multiple videos,

discourse on

elections in

Malaysia.

We assess

that this

network

operated

from Ukraine

and targeted

Ukrainian

audiences.

The

individuals

behind this

network

created

inauthentic

accounts and

hyper-posted

Internal

119

90,303

content with

the aim of

artificially

amplifying

specific

viewpoints

related to the

Ukrainian

government

and of

```
Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 31 of 35 promoting a
                    positive
                    image of
                    President
                    Zelensky.
                    We assess
                    that this
                    network
                    operated
                    from
                    Germany and
                    targeted
                    Egyptian
                    audiences.
                    The
                    individuals
                    behind this
                    network
                    created
                    inauthentic
                                        Internal
                                                                         368,644
                                                         6
                    accounts in
                    order to
                    artificially
                    amplify calls
                    to join non-
                    existing
                    protests in
                    Egypt
                    targeting
                    discourse
```

current

Egyptian


government.

NOTE: Disrupting a covert influence operation requires layered operations, including investigation, removal, and post-mortem analysis. We report the removal of these networks during the quarter in which the full operations process has been completed.

Terminology

- Networks operated from: Indicates geographic location of network operation based on technical and behavioural evidence from proprietary and open sources; TikTok may not be able to attribute networks to specific entities, individuals, or groups.
- Detection source: Denoted as internal when presence of activity is identified solely through an internally driven investigation; external detection refers to investigations that originated through an external report which then led to an investigation.
- **Followers of network:** Cumulative total number of accounts that followed any account within a network as of the date of that network's removal.


Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 33 of 35 Ads policy enforcement



NOTE: Ads may be removed either at the individual ad level or in bulk by taking action against an entire advertiser account.

Case 3:22-cv-03131-JCS Document 81-2 Filed 11/17/23 Page 34 of 35 **Other reports**

- Government Removal Requests
- Intellectual Property Removal Requests
- Information Requests



d TikTok

Programs	Resources	Legal
TikTok for Good	Help Center	Cookies Policy
TikTok Embeds	Safety Center	Privacy Policy for Younger Users
Effect House	Creator Portal	Intellectual Property Policy
TikTok for Developers	Community Guidelines	Law Enforcement
Advertise on TikTok	Transparency	Privacy Policy
TikTok Rewards	Accessibility	Terms of Service
	TikTok for Good TikTok Embeds Effect House TikTok for Developers Advertise on TikTok	TikTok for Good Help Center TikTok Embeds Safety Center Effect House Creator Portal TikTok for Developers Community Guidelines Advertise on TikTok Transparency

English (United States) •

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